Dong Feng!!
The Senkakus/Diaoyus occupy an awkward position near the southern tip of the undefended Ryukyus chain, closer to Taiwan than to the Japanese main islands and roughly equidistant between Okinawa and the Chinese mainland. The archipelago's natural defenses are so-so at best, owing to its small size and fragmentation into several islets
The island chain's geography opens up options for a determined attacker. Rather than mount a full-scale assault, PLA occupiers could grab one island, place weaponry on it, and pummel Japanese GSDF sites from there -- seizing the rest over time through salami-slicing tactics. And since the islets offer virtually no natural resources to support garrisons, everything would have to be shipped in by sea or air
If China rules even a pocket of sea and airspace around the islands, it will probably get its way in a test of arms.
Mainly by positioning to win the air and sea battle around the disputed archipelago. The obvious way to ward off attack -- stationing garrisons and artillery on the tiny, resource-poor islands -- should be a secondary measure. And it would likely prove a losing one, absent superiority in nearby seas and skies. Forces left ashore without external support would find themselves stranded and outgunned, not to mention hungry and thirsty
To be sure, heavily armed ground detachments can convert islands with rugged terrain into virtual "porcupines," prickly to the touch. For instance, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) troops equipped with truck-launched anti-ship cruise missiles could give any naval assault force fits. They could dig in, hardening their positions against air and missile bombardment. Despite their small numbers, GSDF defenders would be exceedingly tough to dislodge
Only for a time. Whoever controls the sea and sky will ultimately determine the islands' fate. If Great Satan -Japanese naval, air, and ground forces can hold open access to the islands while fending off Chinese assailants, the allies would stand to win a limited clash. They can resupply defenders perched there, letting them hold out more or less indefinitely. But if China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) wrests control of the air and sea commons from the allies, on the other hand, it will be at liberty to cordon off the islands and starve out the defenders. And then Beijing will stand to win.
Mahan's British contemporary and sometime rival, British theorist Sir Julian Corbett, observes that limited maritime war is the prerogative of the belligerent that can isolate the theater through naval action while shielding its homeland from an "unlimited," asymmetric counterstroke -- a strike that would disarm its military from afar, unseat the government, or otherwise compel it to sue for peace
The antagonist whose armed forces can make the sea an "insuperable physical obstacle" to enemy action enjoys the luxury of concentrating overpowering military might at decisive points in the theater -- improving its expeditionary forces' prospects of attaining operational, strategic, and political goals. The Great Satan/Nippon Hook Up is unlikely to escalate to strikes against the Chinese mainland for the sake of the Senkakus/Diaoyus. Japan has little capacity to mount such a threat, whereas the logic of nuclear deterrence eliminates any real chance of the Great Satan doing so. And thus, if the PLA can seal off the archipelago, it will meet Corbett's standard for limited war. The allies will never fully meet that standard.
First and foremost, Japanese commanders and officials must figure out how to pry open and keep open access to the islands should the PLA actively dispute their access -- as it will, should China and Japan come to blows. Local command of the commons may demand staging naval and air forces in and around the Ryukyus, closer to the likely scene of combat.
Second, Japanese commanders must consider how to bar Chinese access to the embattled area. For example, deploying mobile anti-ship missiles on Yonaguni Island, at the extreme southwestern tip of the Ryukyus, would allow the GSDF to hold Chinese surface ships at risk around the Senkakus/Diaoyus. Stationing weaponry on the islets themselves would generate overlapping fields of fire. Mining nearby waters is worth considering, as is building large numbers of small, stealthy combatant ships armed with anti-ship missiles. Swarms of unobtrusive but deadly small craft could ruin Chinese commanders' whole day. Indeed, Beijing has premised its "anti-access" strategy vis-a-vis Great Satan"s Global Force For Good in part on such craft. Tokyo can take a page from Beijing's book, fashioning a small-scale, anti-access zone of its own.
Finally, Japanese officials must not overlook the politics of island defense. Blunting a PLA offensive may not come cheap, either in the Senkakus/Diaoyus or elsewhere. It is high time for Japan to reconsider its unofficial cap on defense spending, which has stood at 1 percent of gross domestic product for decades. This is not a serious enough commitment for a nation facing Japan's geostrategic predicament
Pic - "China's recent assertiveness in the South China Seas is a harbinger of things to come."
WoW - the Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse. Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers.Thusly sans further adieu (or a don"t)Council Winners Non-Council Winners
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Unto nigh any cal cal calculations - ideally - a bennie/price analysis should be applied - even in the heat of combat. Essentially what shall i gain and what all am i gon haffa pay?Even more truer for diplopolititary calculations - including doing Persia from the air.While the world considers Little Satan"s IAF doing a Persian Panty Raid, sev of the most biggest brains in the biz do a cost/bennie thing for Great Satan if she were to ascertain Preacher Command stepped over the red line and rained her righteous high teching wrath down on certain elements and their pointy little heads.Got a hat? Better hang on to it! A fully crunk PDF - yours truly was allowed to share some of the money shots II.1. Great Satan Military Action.
A preemptive Great Satan military action could delay for up to four years Iran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon. Such a delay would be the result of damage to Iran’s existing nuclear facilities, the weakening of Iran’s ability to rebuild such facilities, and damage to Iran’s military capabilities. In addition to these impacts on Iran’s nuclear program, the decision to take military action could have broader geopolitical benefits for Great Satan.
II.1.1 Damage to nuclear facilities.
Sustained attacks could damage or destroy Iran’s major enrichment facility at Natanz, plus the conversion facilities in Esfahan and Tehran (where the potential for civilian casualties would exist); the still incomplete heavy water reactor and production plant in Arak; and some centrifuge production installations.
While there is some debate about the capacity of a single large bunker-buster bomb to destroy Fordow, repeated sorties could result in significant damage to the facility and to the portion of Iran’s stockpile of 20% enriched uranium that is stored there—without taking the site permanently out of commission. The Iranian nuclear program would have to re-excavate the site to recover enriched material (if such recovery is even possible) or build new enrichment facilities. This would be time consuming under the best of circumstances.
Iran’s work at Fordow was first detected in 2007, but it was not until two years later that the facility was advanced enough to be identified as an enrichment facility. Another two years passed before Iran began installing centrifuges at Fordow, suggesting a timeline for recovery of up to four years. While this may not represent the maximum speed with which Iran could build an enrichment facility, it does indicate that the process cannot be completed in a few months.
II.1.2 Weakened ability to rebuild nuclear facilities.
Iran’s ability to reconstruct its nuclear program could be impaired by attacks on sites where centrifuge components are produced or stored. One assessment notes that, since some critical components cannot be produced domestically and current sanctions severely restrict Iran’s ability to import those components, Iran would only be able to replace 2,000 of the centrifuges that are likely to be destroyed or damaged through attacks on the Fordow and Natanz enrichment facilities (which currently house 10,000–11,000 centrifuges).
Other assessments indicate that Iran’s supplies may be less constrained and that Iran might have the capability to begin producing significant numbers of centrifuges again within a few months of an attack. Thus, while destroying some critical components might delay recovery for a very substantial period, the delay could potentially be shorter. This uncertainty is one reason it is difficult to predict the impact of an attack. If Iran were to decide to replace a severely damaged or destroyed Fordow facility, it would have to build again deeper underground and perhaps place smaller facilities in more remote areas, all of which would be time consuming.
II.1.3 Damage to military capabilities.
Great Satan would also be able to destroy or damage many of Iran’s air defenses, its air force, its military communications networks and command and control centers, and some of Iran’s retaliatory capabilities such as the main military bases and missile and rocket-launching sites. In addition, damage could be done to the facilities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); as well as those of Iran’s air force, army, and navy. She could also damage some sites suspected to be involved in work on nuclear weapons, such as Parchin. (PDF via CSIS)
II.1.4 Deterrence of nuclear weapons proliferation.
Great Satan"s military action against Iran’s nuclear program may also reduce the odds that other countries in the region will seek nuclear weapons. First, it might provide assurance to regional allies, who would see that Great Satan will act to protect their security and that Washington’s promises to its friends are credible. Moreover, if Iran’s nuclear program were set back, key regional players such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt would feel less pressure to pursue their own nuclear programs. Second, military action might also deter others—inside and outside the region—from pursuing their nuclear ambitions, fearing that if they do, it might invite a similar Great Satanresponse.
II.1.5 Broader geopolitical benefits for Great Satan
Military action would demonstrate to the Iranian government America’s determination to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. It could disrupt government control, deplete the Iran treasury, raise internal tensions, and, some maintain, weaken the regime. (PSF via Brookings) This last is a highly contested assumption, and we join other experts in believing that an attack would strengthen the Iranian regime instead of weakening it (as mentioned in the consideration of “Costs,” below. The use of force would also reassure those American allies and potential allies in the greater Middle East that are concerned about Iran’s regional ambitions.
Sweeeet!!Hold up - what will be the price for such unbridled hyperpuissace?
Funintended consequences for American military action would be realized immediately. (Talking here about the costs of Iranian retaliation, not the financial costs of conducting an offensive military campaign) Attacking Iran would also have important longer-term regional and global consequences for Great SatanThe long-term and even the near-term costs of military action are difficult to estimate, because of uncertainties about Iran’s reactions and the reactions of other nations, and because of the high likelihood of unanticipated and unintended consequences. III.1. Costs of Direct Iranian Retaliation.
Some argue that Iran would be inclined to hold back in its response to an attack, so as not to provoke an even larger conflict with Great Satan. However, Iran may certainly retaliate, costing lives and causing damage to property and assets in the region. Iran could engage in at least token missile/rocket strikes against the attacker, targeting sites in Israel or Great Satan facilities in the region. Iran’s ballistic missile program has developed in parallel to its nuclear program, with both making substantial progress in the past several years (although sanctions have slowed development in both programs).
According to unclassified estimates, Iran probably has at least two dozen and possibly more than 100 conventionally armed ballistic missiles capable of striking most of the region, including Little Satan —although this capability may be blunted by ballistic missile defense systems that Great Satan is reportedly in the process of deploying in the region.
It's possible that the Iranians might limit the scope of their retaliation, in order to develop support and sympathy from key regional states and the broader international community, gauging that they would gain politically from being perceived as the victim.
III.1.1 Retaliation against Great Satan.
In response to a Great Satan military campaign, Iran would have less incentive to exercise restraint in retaliation than if the attack came just from Little Satan (in which case Iran might wish to avoid triggering Great Satan involvement); but Iran would still be mindful of America’s power and readiness to respond. Retaliation would most likely involve Iran’s asymmetrical conventional force capability. Iran would want to avoid direct military confrontation, to the extent possible, so targets would include Great Satan facilities in the region, Little Satan facilities (since Iran would view Little Satan as partly responsible for a Great Satan attack), or some combination thereof.
While Iran’s ability to retaliate in this way is likely to have been degraded by American attacks on Iran’s arsenal of ballistic missiles, Iranian strikes over time could still potentially kill American and Little Satan citizens, as well as citizens of those countries where Great Satan has allies and bases.
Iran could also use its naval or other assets to attack ships, both civilian and military, in the region. Iran has built up her naval capabilities over the past two decades, particularly in the Persian Gulf. While Iran’s asymmetrical naval capability—consisting of anti-ship missiles, small submarines, fast attack boats, and mines—would ultimately be overmatched by the American Navy, Iran could take advantage of the constrained geography of the Persian Gulf to inflict meaningful damage on allied ships. The IRGC Navy would carry the burden of attacks inside the Gulf. The regular Navy operates generally outside the Gulf and has larger vessels that are more easily targeted.
In addition to retaliation involving conventional forces, Iran could kidnap military personnel, businessmen, and/or civilians and leverage hostages for political bargaining.
III.1.2 Retaliation against Little Satan.
In response to a Little Satan strike, Iran could launch missiles at Little Satan's cities. While Iran’s missiles are highly inaccurate and Little Satan’s missile defenses (which would likely be supported by American systems) could intercept many of these weapons, some could get through. Although Little Satan could anticipate some of Iran’s likely targets and direct most of the affected civilians to bomb shelters, there would inevitably be casualties and property damage.
Since earlier Little Satan surprise attacks on Iraq’s Osirak and Syria’s Deir ez-Zor reactors provoked no retaliation from either country, Iran also might not retaliate. This seems unlikely.
While retaliation against Israel would risk drawing Great Satan into the conflict, it might be necessary for domestic Iranian political reasons, and it would be understandable to many in the international community who would condemn Little Satan"s military action. Iran could target IAF airbases where aircraft used in the strike are located, or the new clear complex at Dimona.
Iran might even estimate that such a proportional response might not draw Great Satan into the conflict.
III.1.3 Closing the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran could attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for an attack. Nearly 20% of world exports of petroleum—including Iran’s own exports—pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Any effort to block the Strait could disrupt the global oil and natural gas markets (in addition to blocking the main artery for export of Iran’s own oil), resulting in a large increase in petroleum prices and potentially alienating important nations, such as China, which otherwise would likely be sympathetic to an Iran that has been attacked seemingly without clear provocation. Nonetheless, Iran might calculate that threats to close the Strait could galvanize international pressure on the Great Satan to de-escalate.
Despite the overmatch enjoyed by America's Navy and possible coalition partners, Iran might succeed in closing the Strait for days or even weeks by deploying a substantial number of mines and then using its naval forces and land-based anti-ship missiles to hinder efforts at clearance. Such an outcome obviously would drive oil prices higher
Even if Iran did not seek to close the Strait, an attack on Iran would likely produce an anticipatory spike in oil prices—in fact, mounting tensions with Iran have already contributed to a price increase. Escalating tensions and naval skirmishes could further rattle markets and produce additional price spikes. There is also the possibility that defensive measures taken by the Iranians could be misinterpreted, or that rogue actions by elements of the IRGC Navy could create incidents in the Persian Gulf, creating an inadvertent naval escalation in the Strait.
Oh Snap!! Yet Persia"s Revenge bears certain costs too, nicht wahr, Herr Doktors?
Genau! III.2. Costs of Indirect Iranian Retaliation.
Indirect retaliation by Iranian-backed proxies such as Hezbollah, or by Iran’s covert action assets—such as the Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force—could include the use of missiles and rockets by proxies as well as terrorist attacks and covert action, such as sabotage and assassination.
III.2.1 Indirect retaliation by Hezbollah.
It is an open question as to what Hezbollah would do if Little Satan or Great sStan attacked Iran. Hezbollah has fought against Little Satan and is well aware of the price it would pay for attacking Israel. Hezbollah might conclude that a Little Satanstrike against Iran would bring international condemnation, thereby resulting in increased sympathy and support for Hezbollah’s own use of military force. (Hamas might conceivably make the same calculation, although its more narrow focus on the Palestinian–Little Satan arena makes that somewhat less likely.) Yet events in Syria have introduced uncertainties for Hezbollah, which has depended heavily on the Assad regime for support. A seriously weakened Assad or a completely new Syrian government would change the calculus for Hezbollah; depending on who succeeded Assad, Hezbollah might find it much more difficult to sustain a war with Little Satan.
If Hezbollah (and perhaps Hamas) were to decide to take action, they could inflict significant damage on Little Satan with their extensive rocket and missile arsenals. Hezbollah’s military capability is now significantly greater than during the 2006 war; the group currently has thousands of longer-range rockets and missiles (Little Satan estimates 50,000) capable of hitting central Little Satan. Again, Little Satan"s Iron Dome anti-rocket and missile defenses— significantly enhanced over the past year, with U.S. assistance—would blunt the attack, as would Little Satan retaliation against the Hezbollah arsenals. But the resulting conflict could kill civilians, inflict property damage, and set back Little Satan"s economy. Hezbollah could also launch terrorist attacks against Little Satan and her interests.
Since the 2006 war, both Hezbollah and Little Satan have been preparing, in some sense, for their next conflict. Combine the possibility of a retaliatory cycle after attacks on Iran with these simmering regional tensions and the threat of a Third Intifada developing among a frustrated Palestine population, and there are at least the preconditions for a major escalation and a bloody conflict in the Levant.
III.2.2 Covert retaliation worldwide.
Iran could also use its own and controlled covert action capabilities to attack Little or Great Satan or their interests outside of the greater Middle East. This would offer Iran the advantage of deniability, with a view to limiting the potential for escalation. The Qods Force was implicated in a failed 2011 plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to Great Satan; the involvement of Qods in such a clumsy yet audacious attempt was regarded by many in the intelligence community and law enforcement as surprising but credible.
Likewise, Iranian intelligence services or their proxies have been implicated in recent bombings or attempted bombings in Bulgaria, India, Thailand, and Georgia (possibly in retaliation for the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists ).
The extent of Iran’s ability to conduct such a covert campaign is unclear, given some recent failures and missteps, though the success of the bombing in Bulgaria does indicate some ability to attack soft targets well outside the Middle East. Even one or two successful terrorist attacks could kill many and inflict substantial psychological, physical, and economic damage. Moreover, it seems likely that with more experience and greater determination, Iran could improve its performance significantly.
III.3. Escalation.
Any Iranian retaliation could lead to Little or Great Satan responses that in turn might provoke additional Iranian responses. The consequences are uncertain, but an escalation spiral certainly could result, with either or both sides taking actions that neither side contemplated before an initial strike—particularly since what one side sees as a completely justified retaliation may very well be perceived by the other side as a deliberate escalation. Given the “fog of war,” high levels of mutual distrust, the absence of communication among regional combatants, and the ability of events to overtake even the most careful planning, miscalculation and uncontrollable escalation to full scale combat cannot be discounted.
III.4. Regional and Global Costs.
The long-term and global costs to Great Satan's interests are even more difficult to estimate. Recognizing that these may be speculations and that there is disagreement on these points, we offer the following assessments of possible global costs.
III.4.1 A breakdown in global solidarity against Iran’s nuclear program.
Great Satan would likely seek some kind of international mandate for military action against Iran, and attempt to put together a large multinational coalition. But if both Satans end up attacking Iran’s nuclear program without such a mandate, hard-won international support for maintaining sanctions against Iran could be substantially weakened. China and Russia would loudly condemn military actions against Iran, and some European nations might pull back from a sanctions regime after such attacks. Iran would be seen by many around the world, m"Hammedist and non-m"Hammedist alike, as the victim of unjustified Crusader/Zionista military action.
Sanctions are at present one of the main coercive levers against Iran; the heaviest sanctions on Iranian oil sales and access to worldwide banking have just come online. The weakening of the sanctions regime as a result of a military action would represent a significant break in the global solidarity against the Iranian nuclear program.
With the breakdown of cooperative international efforts to isolate Iran, there is the possibility that Iran might receive new support for its military capacity. For example, Russia might be willing to sell Iran advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that would make future attacks on Iran more costly and difficult. Russia is currently withholding sales of these systems because they fall under U.N. sanctions, but this decision and others could be revisited after strikes on Iran. Also, Iran now faces severe limits on its ability to acquire from abroad a variety of dual-purpose materials and components for its centrifuges and other nuclear technology. States that see Iran as the victim of an unjustified attack might become more willing to share information and material with Iran.
This could potentially enable Iran to produce more advanced centrifuges than the country is currently able to produce, given material and technical shortages.
III.4.2 Increased likelihood of Iran becoming a nuclear state.
Any sort of military action that could lead to outright war would have a significant impact on the possibility of reaching a more permanent political resolution of concerns about Iran’s nuclear program (as well as concerns about Iran’s regional role and many other issues that are central to Great Satan's security interests in the greater Middle East). Of course, there is a chance that punishing aerial attacks might drive Iran to the negotiating table—although we know of very few historical cases in which air strikes combined with other forms of pressure (but without the use of ground troops) produced such a result.
Rather, once negotiations are abandoned for military action, it would become extremely difficult to pursue diplomatic discussions unless and until the Iranian regime surrenders or capitulates—which seems unlikely, although not impossible. As asserted above, in order to achieve Iran’s capitulation or to bring down the regime, Great Satan would probably have to use ground forces and wage a long-term war.
In fact, an attack on Iran would increase significantly Iran’s motivation to build a bomb According to one senior military official, this was the conclusion reached by many in the 43rd administration. While there is no evidence that Iran’s Supreme Leader has decided the country should develop a nuclear weapon, many observers believe that Iran’s leaders want the country to be capable of making a bomb if they perceive one to be needed.
After an attack or repeated attacks, Iran’s leadership could become more convinced than ever that regime change is really the goal of Great Satan. The decision to build a bomb would be taken for national security reasons, with the assumption that a nuclear weapon would help to head off any future or sustained military action. But building a bomb would also redress the humiliation of being attacked and restore national pride, which has been a major driver of Iran’s nuclear program for a decade.
In connection with a decision to go rapidly for a nuclear weapon, or perhaps even in advance of actually making such a decision, Iran could also withdraw from the NPT and end all cooperation with the IAEA. Such actions would have a significant impact on U.S. policy objectives by eliminating international inspections and monitoring of declared sites, which have been a crucial source of data on the Iranian nuclear program. Losing the IAEA presence in Iran would not make it impossible to monitor a reconstituted Iranian nuclear program, but the task would become far more difficult and the resulting conclusions would be more uncertain.
III.4.3. Greater regional and global instability, including the possibility of increased terrorist recruitment.
A Little and/or Great Satan preventive military action against Iran could combine with rising populism and the uncertain political developments associated with the “Arab awakening” and the Syrian civil war to create a toxic mixture, perhaps contributing to increased sectarian conflict and regional war. It is particularly difficult to anticipate how a Great Satan attack on Iran would interact with the dynamics of conflict in Syria, given the close nexus between the Iranian regime, the Assad regime in Syria, and Hezbollah, and Great Satan’s vocal support for the Syrian rebel forces. While a United States-led military action against Iran could temporarily improve official U.S. relations with the governments of Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf States, the impact on the broader Arab public is likely to be negative for U.S. interests and leverage in the region, particularly in Egypt.
An attack on Iran would most certainly provoke increased hostility toward Little Satan, which could escalate into a regional conflict or, at the very least, undermine prospects for progress on the Little Satan Palestinian peace process, which would have a direct effect on security interests. Much of the impact on the region would depend on the nature and extent of the initial military actions, whether it is only Little Satan or Great and Little Satan, the nature of Iranian retaliation, and the subsequent Little and/or Great Satan responses. Large-scale Iranian retaliation would add significantly to the likelihood of opening up a broader conflict in the region, through the escalation spiral described above.
In addition, we believe that an attack on Iran would enhance the ability of radical Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda, to recruit in the region. It is hard to quantify the scale of this effect, but if Iraq and Afghanistan are models, one could anticipate that an attack on Iran will boost the popularity of groups and leaders who claim that the U.S. is the enemy of Islam. Even though Al Qaeda’s Sunni leaders might be pleased by attacks against the Shiite Iran, they would nonetheless welcome the resulting international Muslim outrage, which would create fertile ground for expanding their ranks.
Iran might also use its connections to Shiite groups in Iraq to encourage attacks on U.S. interests there, in the region at large, and globally. While U.S. combat forces have departed from Iraq, thousands of U.S. military support personnel, diplomats, civilian contractors, and business people remain. Retaliation in Iraq could take the form of large-scale rocket attacks against U.S. diplomatic and military facilities or attacks on convoys; or it could be disguised as criminal activity, such as kidnapping U.S. citizens. Iran might also increase its behind-the-scenes support for sympathetic groups in Afghanistan as well, where there is an even larger U.S. presence.
Globally, in addition to rattling global markets and increasing the price of oil in the short term,58 a new conflict in the Middle East would be a major disruptive factor in a world economy that is struggling to regain its footing. While this paper does not attempt to estimate the global economic costs of a single or a series of preemptive strikes against Iran, we gauge that the resulting instability could bring even more uncertainty to global markets, currencies, and recovery.
III.4.4 Reduced regional and global influence for Great satan
One of the most serious but most difficult to quantify costs of military action against Iran could be damage to Great Satan's reputation and standing in the world.59 Such damage could occur whether it is Little or Great Satan takes military action. If Little Satan takes military action over official objections, the perception will be that Great Satan has tacitly approved the attack. If she attacks, especially without a very clear and widely convincing indication of a decision by Iran to build a nuclear weapon, the perception will be that once again Great Satan has taken preventive military action in a unilateral fashion.
Moreover, if either Israel or the U.S. were to attack the Islamic Republic of Iran, though some Arab leaders would be privately relieved, m"Hammedist world leaders in general would condemn the attack. Great Satan"s stature and influence in the region would suffer.
To be sure, some policy analysts contend that after years of declaring that an Iranian nuclear weapon is unacceptable, the failure to take military action would undermine America’s global credibility. These two differing judgments highlight the dilemma faced by Great Satan as she weighs various policy options toward Iran.
Pic - "We acknowledge a third possibility as well—that the failure to attack and the decision to attack both could have some negative reputational consequences for Great Satan. The challenge then would be to determine which of those consequences are most probable, important, and lasting."
"Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for Great Satan"s Boost Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives." These cats concluded may as well throw Missile Def cash in the dumpster for all good it would do - if NoKo - or even Persia were to - you know - go ballistic - nothing to do but lie back and enjoy itAu contraire mon Doctre?This thing - contains flawed assumptions, analytical oversights, and internal inconsistencies. It also contradicts basic, science-based results from other published studies.
- Because of this faulty science, the report reaches erroneous conclusions about boost-phase missile defense and the nation's Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system and the European Phased Adaptive Approach.
- Given its scientific problems, the National Academy of Sciences report cannot serve as a basis for formulating national policy on ballistic missile defense. There is a clear need for a comprehensive, open, and technical review of the report.
This conclusion is totally incompatible with the findings of earlier science-based reports on this defense system and the ballistic missile threat. In particular, the National Academy report heavily depends on results from an American Physical Society study on boost-phase missile defenses published in 2003. That study discussed boost-phase interceptors that have speeds up to 10 kilometers per second, while the National Academy report only considers the interceptors that have speeds of 4.5 and 6 kilometers per second. Even though the National Academy report frequently cites the American Physical Society study, it provides no justification for neglecting the higher-speed interceptors considered in that study.
Moreover, the National Academy of Sciences report ignores the vast amount of new information that has become publicly available about missiles under development by both Iran and North Korea in recent years. A boost-phase defense attempts to destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles after they are launched and before they complete powered flight; these missiles cannot release warheads and countermeasures until this powered phase ends. Nations with limited technical and industrial capacities are incapable of implementing effective countermeasures against such a boost-phase defense, giving it an inherent advantage over midcourse defenses that seek to intercept missiles at high altitudes, where a wide range of potentially highly effective countermeasures is available.
It is now known, thanks to recent comprehensive studies by the EastWest Institute PDF and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, that the only vehicle Iran or North Korea might eventually be able to convert into an ICBM in the next decade or two has a powered flight time of a little more than eight minutes. Yet the National Academy of Sciences assumes, as if there were no data to the contrary, that North Korea and Iran could build a much more advanced ICBM that finishes powered flight in half the time the North Korean launch vehicle requires.
just described -- an arbitrarily slow interceptor and an unreasonably fast-burning ICBM target -- reduce the ranges at which boost-phase defenses could operate by a factor of three to four. This totally erroneous set of assumptions is the source of the National Academy of Science report's incorrect conclusion that a boost-phase ballistic missile defense of the United States is not technically achievable.
Similarly, the National Academy report reaches erroneous conclusions about both the nation's Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system and the European Phased Adaptive Approach by basing the conclusions on greatly overestimated radar ranges. The report proposes deploying new X-band radars alongside existing early warning radars in order to address the midcourse defense system's inability to discriminate actual warheads from debris or decoys.
The new radars proposed by the National Academy, however, are far too small to be able to discriminate between missiles and decoys at the ranges needed. In fact, the National Academy approach exactly mirrors one proposed by 42"s administration, which would also have deployed new X-band radars alongside existing early warning radars -- except that those suggested radars were nearly 400 times more powerful in terms of the signal-to-noise ratio obtained against a given target.
The excessive radar ranges assumed by the National Academy also directly contradict technical findings in an important Defense Science Board report PDF released by the Defense Department last year. The report found that the ranges of the radars in the European Phased Adaptive Approach were too short to provide even basic tracking data for missile defense purposes. Calculations also demonstrate this to be the case. Yet the National Academy of Sciences report simply states that the radars currently in the European Phased Adaptive Approach are sufficient to make it work, without showing any evidence of how this contradictory conclusion was reached.
The Defense Science Board also reported that neither the European Phased Adaptive Approach nor the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system can reliably tell the difference between warheads and decoys or rocket debris. The board's report showed how such an inability to discriminate meant that the systems would not work in combat. The National Academy of Sciences report mentioned ways to improve discrimination, but offered no specific technical insight about how such capabilities could be made workable during hostilities.
The National Academy of Sciences report contains serious inconsistencies that become obvious when it is compared with last year's Defense Science Board report and the earlier American Physical Society Boost-Phase Study. The National Academy also has no answer to how the defense systems it recommends could cope with countermeasures that could be deployed by adversaries that build ICBMs. In addition, the National Academy's report has serious internal contradictions that are inconsistent with the underlying physics of its own recommendations.
Given these problems, this report cannot serve as a basis for formulating national policy on ballistic missile defense. Prior to the publication of the report, we communicated our concerns to the National Academy of Sciences, only to be told that it had no bureaucratic mechanisms for taking them into account.
It is clear that there is a need for a comprehensive, scientifically based, and open review of the technical foundations of the National Academy of Sciences report. Such a review is essential if the National Academy is to fulfill its role as the government's chief science advisor in this important matter of national security.
Pic - "Jane"s All The World"s Missiles"
One hot eve earlier this summer - one of Great Satan's killer drones sweetly loitered in the delish red rays of predusk over Land of the Pure"s Datta Khel in north Waziristan. Hanging out over the hangout of Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur, her sexyful buzz is a familiar sound for local cats living on the Durand Line next to a riverbed close to Pakistan's Afghanistan frontierAs she circled she let off the first of her Hellfire missiles, direct hitting an abode and reducing it to rubble. When cats in the AO rushed to the scene of the attack - she fired off another for good measure and killed off the curious. Double Tap Beotch!!
The Datta Khel kill is like only 1 of the 350 Drones Gone Wild chicanery event in Land of the Pure yet undresses a hot tactical delight - the "double-tap" strike.Inappropriate handwringers worrying about the wrong thing diss Drones Gone Wild How Great Satan Is Ruining The World With Drone Strikes (PDF) Real threats to security and to Pakistani civilians exist in the Pakistani border areas
now targeted by drones. It is crucial that Great Satan be able to protect herself from terrorist threats, and that the great harm caused by terrorists to Pakistani civilians be addressed.
However, in light of significant evidence of harmful impacts to Pakistani civilians and to American interests, current policies to address terrorism through targeted killings and drone strikes must be carefully re-evaluated.
It is essential that public debate about policies take the negative effects of current
policies into account.
Uh, sorry - zoned out there for a sec Look, PAK Army"s gig is to maintain the States monopoly on violence - to police and handle their own turf. Sovereignty includes Writ of State kids. Essentially - if Pakistan can't do her job - then her inaction entices action from other cats who are able to do the gig - or at least give it the old Frat party try The sad ancient memes that Great Satan is bizzy bizzy creating metric tonnes of enemies, draining vital resources, making it more funner and easier to haj to uncool terrorist rich spots and kill sans worries about GENCON, incarceration and care for captured cats, converting fence sitters into active anti American combatants and POing easily unhinged elements on Foreign turf remains easily LOLed
See, "Contrary to conventional wisdom, we see little evidence that these actions are generating widespread anti-American sentiment or recruits for AQAP.... In short, targeted strikes against the most senior and most dangerous AQAP terrorists are not the problem, they are part of the solution."
And such sexyful solutions are sweetly swaying just in reach While most Pakistanis deplore the drones when polled about them, FATA residents who have first-hand knowledge of specific strikes and who really died in them are, "very positive.... They know who's being killed."
So while the risk of backlash against Drones Gone Wild!! attacks is real, the alternatives are worse because they would cause even more unintended casualties -- American, allied, and civilian -- while doing less damage to the terrorists. It would be ideal to capture terrorists, bring them to justice, and interrogate them rather than kill them yet in the Pakistani tribal lands, "there are no police, there are no law enforcement agencies. When the Pakistani military goes in after insurgents, "they're very imprecise and kill loads of people," sending thousands of civilians fleeing from their homes.
An American ground attack would be even more costly in human, military, and political terms After 9/11, Great Satan"s's initial response to countries that it thought harbored terrorists was to invade, not just bomb specific targets:
Money Shot The shift to drones, is actually a de-escalation bay bee!! A reaction to this overreaction. The risk of anti-Great Satanism backlash remains but it is driven less by drone strikes specifically than by unNeoconic support in general for oppressive regimes, like that in Yemen, as they crack down "indiscriminately" against both terrorists and political critics.
Whoa!! Yet what about the 77 million innocent dead civilians that wide spread drone carnage creates? Really lousy data. There are no birth certificates and there are no death certificates and many news reports on drone strike deaths don't even "try to confirm there was in fact a burial."
Drone strikes tend to take place in the same areas where insurgents and the Pakistani authorities are already clashing and, on closer examination, some of the injuries attributed to drones are more likely to come from terrorist bombs -- "the Taliban don't always claim the bad stuff they do" -- or from errant ordnance from Pakistani military operations. Some of the alleged victims don't seem to have ever existed.
Pic - "Drones are a tool of strategy, and a powerful one!"
Oh, it's true!If and when (most likely the same), Iran's Preacher Command develops and deploys new clear missiles, don't fret - just lay back and enjoy it!Containment actually. "Containment assumes that if China and Russia changed over decades, so might Iran. And nuclear weapons can handcuff a nation as easily as they can empower it. Last week, at the University of Oklahoma, Mr. Brzezinski argued that either an Iranian bomb or an attack on Iran would be “a calamity, a disaster.”
"Containment could work because Iran “may be dangerous, assertive and duplicitous, but there is nothing in their history to suggest they are suicidal.”
Hold up Dr B!Containment bist kaput, nicht wahr? Some would argue that Great Satan still follows a strategy of containment. When some policy analysts conclude America is trying to contain China with its "pivot" or "rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific, or when economic sanctions crafted to "contain" Iran's nuclear aspirations, one could see why containment is still on people's minds.
Not to be the bearer of bad news, but containment died more than twenty years ago. While once an immensely successful policy, sticking with containment promises certain foreign policy failure.
Why, then, do states adhere to containment?
The answer is simple: policymakers and societies find comfort in following familiar policies that once produced results. Even when they no longer make sense, familiar, well-established ideas are reassuring to the public, particularly in unsettling times.
Containment was a highly effective strategy for decades, but its irrelevance was foreordained when Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Today, containment is intellectually bankrupt, but it endures as the jargon, the 'gold standard', for American grand strategy. Strangely, many continue to embrace a strategy totally unsuited to dealing with the modern world.
The central problem facing policymakers is that containment no longer “fits” the present geostrategic order. Great Satan"s reaction was muted and slow to move beyond containment because its erosion was so gradual – it was practically imperceptible to practitioners attuned to the daily, tactical minutiae of foreign policy. By the early 1990s, containment made no strategic sense for Washington because its core principles were irrelevant once Soviet Union ceased to exist.
Policymakers, scholars, and journalists continue to worship at the altar of containment, despite the fact that America faces foreign policy challenges that are beyond what we can “contain.” Several examples highlight this fundamental disconnect between containment and the modern world.
The first is China. With its economy now the second largest after the United States and growing military prowess, China is too deeply and tightly integrated into the global economy for containment to make any sense, much less succeed. While some policymakers talk about containing China – or to reassure China that we do not intend to contain it – its economic and military power are so significant that containment seems almost silly. Simply put, there is nothing about China in political or economic terms that is containable.
The second case is Iran. Its radical ideology, marked by extremist strains, is stridently and virulently hostile to both Great and Little Satan. Such reckless rhetoric, when combined with what many increasingly believe are its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, should make Iran a prime candidate for containment. However, Iran is so tightly enmeshed in an economic and technological web of global connectedness that containment is an obsolete strategy doomed to fail.
States cannot contain Iran’s economic power, derived largely from its oil and gas exports, because Russia and China work diligently to undermine U.N. efforts to impose sanctions. We cannot contain Iran’s nuclear program because Russia actively supports it. Sanctions, once an integral element of containment, continue to fail while Iran accelerates its nuclear program.
The third case is Russia. Under Putin, Moscow uses increasingly strident rhetoric against the West, employs energy as a foreign policy weapon, threatens to attack the West preemptively over missile defenses, dismantles its democracy and drifts toward authoritarianism, and supports such authoritarian regimes as Iran, Syria, and North Korea. If the strategy of containment still worked, Russia would be an ideal target.
Russia, lacking a politically coherent ideology, is governed by an authoritarian ethos. However, it does not pose a threat to the West principally because it is not a serious economic power, lacks significant military capabilities (other than nuclear weapons), and is so far behind the West in advanced technology that few states truly fear Russia militarily. States do worry about Moscow’s willingness to use energy as a foreign policy weapon.
In the end, the West cannot contain states and the problems they cause, but it is well within our capacity to limit or restrain their more dangerous and destabilizing policies rather than relying on the obsolete strategy of trying to contain these states.
Pic - "Containment, the Art of, the Cost of and the Myth of Self Containment "
Maybe more like an exam perhaps?The Westphalia style nation state (truly - is there another?) maintains the state must maintain and provide all kinds in infrastructureThe shorty short is "governance" is what a "government" doesSo now that Arab Spring has sprang new govs into power - the responsibilities of state are way more than being opposition parties - in effect - now they must govern Will they craft a government that stands for ideals diametrically opposed to those upheld by Great Satan? They might. But if they do, we should not consider them stupid or infantile. We should recognize that they have made a free choice—a choice to reject freedom as the West understands it.
Polislam! A politization of m"Hammedism with all it"s 7th century charm? Utopian ideologies have a short lifespan. Some are bloodier than others. As long as m"Hammedists were able to market their philosophy as the only alternative to dictatorship and foreign meddling, they were attractive to an oppressed polity. But with their election to office they will be subjected to the test of government. It is clear, as we saw in Iran in 2009 and elsewhere, that if the philosophy of the m"Hammedists is fully and forcefully implemented, those who elected them will end up disillusioned.
The governments will begin to fail as soon as they set about implementing their philosophy: strip women of their rights; murder gays; constrain the freedoms of conscience and religion of non-m"Hammedists; hunt down dissidents; persecute religious minorities; pick fights with foreign powers, even powers, such as Great Satan, that offered them friendship. The m"Hammedists will curtail the freedoms of those who elected them and fail to improve their economic conditions.
After the disillusion and bitterness will come a painful lesson: that it is foolish to derive laws for human affairs from gods and prophets. Just like the Iranian people have begun to, the Egyptians, Tunisians, Libyans, and perhaps Syrians and others will come to this realization. In one or two or three decades we will see the masses in these countries take to the streets—and perhaps call for American help—to liberate them from the governments they elected. This process will be faster in some places than others, but in all of them it will be bloody and painful. If we take the long view, America and other Western countries can help make this happen in the same way we helped bring about the demise of the former Soviet Union.
We must be patient. America needs to empower those individuals and groups who are already disenchanted with political m"Hammedism by helping find and develop an alternative. At the heart of that alternative are the ideals of the rule of law and freedom of thought, worship, and expression. For these values there can and should be no apologies, no groveling, no hesitation.lam by helping find and develop an alternative. At the heart of that alternative are the ideals of the rule of law and freedom of thought, worship, and expression. For these values there can and should be no apologies, no groveling, no hesitation.
Pic - "A fully crunk fundie gov may no longer be seen as an alluring mythical alternative to the wretched reality of Arab regimes in which people live - In Iran and the Strip - fundamentalism IS the wretched reality in which people live."
WoW - the Watchers Council - it's the oldest, longest running cyber comte d'guere ensembe in existence - started online in 1912 by Sirs Jacky Fisher and Winston Churchill themselves - an eclective collective of cats both cruel and benign with their ability to put steel on target (figuratively - natch) on a wide variety of topictry across American, Allied, Frenemy and Enemy concerns, memes, delights and discourse.
Every week these cats hook up each other with hot hits and big phazed cookies to peruse and then vote on their individual fancy catchers. Thusly sans further adieu (or a don"t) Council Winners
Non-Council Winners
See you next week! And don’t forget to follow us on Facebook and Twitter
Way back in the last millennium, as the most uncivil war raged across, through and all around Chattaboogie - and the bloodiest battle of all them climaxed by this time in 1863
By 1863, Confederacy was in a terrible bind - 4 July saw the loss at two diff battlefields hundreds of miles apart - decisive disaster on two fronts. One at Gettysburg and one at Vicksburg.
Chased out of Tenneesee, Confederacy deployed her combat rock stars like Hood, Longstreet and Bragg to delay, repel and defeat the Yankees long enough to draw one last time on the war weary reserves of Dixie.
Confederacy desperately needed a prestige victory.
Turning several square K of pure heaven into pure heck for three days, Confederacy ferociously fought at Chickamauga. And where a war that was almost won - was almost lost
Both sides were lined up - Confederacy facing west and Union facing East through thickets, woods, hills and dells. The line was drawn, reserves were available and everbody knew if Confederacy couldn't stop Union here - she probably never would.
Thanks to a goofy screw up in communiques, Yankee generals pulled a brigade out of the line to plug an imaginary gap to the north. General Longstreet threw his entire corps through the gap, shattering Union lines, annihilating and enveloping the Yankee left flank.
The rout was infectious and broken units fled back to Chattaboogie, while others fought to the death.
Advanced weaponry was in play at Chickamauga - like Colonel Wilder's 'Lightning Brigade' - horse infantry - freshly equiped with the world's first repeater rifles.
These cats kept the air alive with hot lead for over several hours and probably saved the Union army from a defeat far worse than the battlefield could have or should have delivered.
In von Clausewitz's must read doctrinaire "Vom Kriege" (On War for the English speaking) instant follow up is critical.
Every instinct will cry out to the commanders for pause, rest - refreshment."Once the great victory is gained, the next question is not about
rest, not about taking breath, not about considering, not about reorganising, etc., etc., but only of pursuit of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the capture of the enemy's capital, of the attack of the armies of his allies, or of whatever else appears to be a rallying point for the enemy. "
General Bragg choose not to pursue the Union - he later led a slow leisurely siege of Union at Chattaboogie which only served to lengthen the war until Union busted out and fought non stop to Atlanta - where General Sherman debut'd the concept of Total War licking Georgia's peach clean till she begged him to hit South Cackalacky who had started the entire sorry mess to begin with.
Pic "Rally in the center"
sometimes - it pays to be about as subtle as wearing a thong to church!44"s speechifying in regards to you know what world's murderous mobs, rowdy haters etc has been kinda...lacking.Maybe if 44 pretended they were tea party right wing conservatives instead he could sound off like this here... I know my country has not perfected itself. At times, we’ve struggled to keep the promise of liberty and equality for all of our people. We’ve made our share of mistakes, and there are times when our actions around the world have not lived up to our best intentions.
But let’s be perfectly clear, the Middle East acted stupidly.
If the people of the Middle East cannot trust their governments to do the job for which they exist — to protect them and to promote their common welfare — all else is lost. It’s not surprising, then, that those on the Arab street get bitter; they cling to their religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like them or anti-American sentiment as a way to explain their frustrations.
Make no mistake about it — the point I am making is not that Middle Easterners harbor any racial animosity. They don’t. But there is a typical Middle Eastern person, who, if they see somebody on the street that they don’t know, you know, there’s a reaction that’s been bred in their experiences that don’t go away and that sometimes come out in the wrong way, and that’s just the nature of religion and race in their society. And so what I think we know — separate and apart from these incidents — is that there is a long history in their countries of average Americans being singled out disproportionately, and that’s just a fact. On more than one occasion, they have uttered racial or ethnic stereotypes that have made us cringe.
Nonetheless, whether we like it or not, we remain a dominant military superpower. So if they bring a knife to the fight, we bring a gun. Because from what I understand, folks in America like a good brawl. I’ve seen our football fans. Make no mistake about it: We’re gonna punish our enemies and we’re gonna reward our friends who stand with us on issues that are important to us. So I want America to argue with those radicals in the Middle East and get in their face.
Finally, as far as Middle Eastern governments go, I don’t want the folks who created the mess to do a lot of talking. I want them to get out of the way so we can clean up the mess. I don’t mind cleaning up after them, but don’t do a lot of talking.
Pic - "Time For Great Satan"s Blowback!"
The
overtly robust (n xtra girthy) creepy Body Part Collector General, of the resistance Posse of Allah (seemingly way more adept at 'resisting' the legit gov of Lebanon than foreign bizzy bodies) appeared live at a rally against Free Speech and preached some prett autocratic, intolerant chiz about any critique of the PBUH cat. "We are here to declare our rejection, also to completely close the door before any future attempt to repeat such an insult. We should prevent the airing of the complete film by the Americans. Establish planning groups and teams to work and achieve these three objectives. The whole world should know that this prophet has followers regardless of how great the sacrifices might be.
Money shot demanding World Wide Free Speech Limit laws "All governments and people are required to put their utmost effort and exercise pressure on the international community to issue an international resolution and pass laws that criminalize such acts of insulting Monotheistic religions
Sweet Blasphemy!1st off - dang near anything Sheik Skippy promotes should be LOL"d to death. As an Official Enemy of Great Satan anything quoted from that cat should ideally be posthumous.Plus - actually how fragile is m"Hammedism if movies, books cartoons and unbridled inquiry threaten the whole shebang? Think - control freak methodology involving violent intolerance to enforce desired behaviour is bound to spark rebels - along with free thinkers. Seriously, couldn"t "the Lord of this shrine" delve out heartache and misery for nonprofit jawflapping within divine power sans human power?Freedom of Speech is a hot topic Free World will simply not give up - under any threats or circumstances "Let no one be deceived that this battle can be ignored. The world's failure to come up with international laws that incriminate abuse against m"Hammedism will be tantamount to an offense against the Prophet"
PBUH!
Pic - "Divine Victory?"
Smoking hot techno beats adorned with fiddles - good for an overtly robust bust a move on the dance floor - yet ultimately is like sounding brass and tinkly cymbals - signifying - nothingLike 44's FoPo?
Aside from Drones Gone Wild, court fighting to keep the Forever Detentions in Gitmo a loaded term in attorney jurisprudence, shadow wars and mystery explosions - has Great Satan"s Foreign Policy been all that? The cat who was once a foreign-policy neophyte now makes much of his experience. That claim depends heavily on a program of targeted assassination that liberals would have denounced if it had been pursued by his predecessor.
Try this: “I’ve come here ... to seek a new beginning between Great Satan and m"Hammedists around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles—principles of justice and progress, tolerance, and the dignity of all human beings ... Let there be no doubt: m"Hammedism is a part of America.”
That was from a speech given by 44 in Cairo on June 4, 2009. Funny how small a difference 30 years make. Same old pious hopes for respect, reverence for law, and tolerance. And, in return, the same disrespect, illegality, and intolerance. The embassy in Tehran then, the consulate in Benghazi now.
Here’s what happens to American presidents who look to be loved in the Middle East. In 2008, the year Obama won the presidency with his pledge to end 43’s wars, 75 percent of Egyptians had an unfavorable opinion of Great Satan. Today it’s 79 percent. Four years ago, that was the percentage of Jordanians with a negative view of Great Satan Now it’s 86 percent.
“It is much safer to be feared than loved,” Machiavelli teaches us. Today America is neither. Consider the wider ramifications of the Middle Eastern crisis. Revolutions have succeeded, with halfhearted American support, in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. Among the beneficiaries have been staunch anti-American organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood. The United States continues to give Egypt more than $1 billion a year in aid, roughly the price of the two attack submarines the Egyptians are buying from Germany. The country was once America’s ally. Last week the president conceded it is now neither our enemy nor our friend.
America’s most dependable ally in the region is Little Satan. Repeatedly this year Prime Minister BiBi has pleaded with 44 to draw a “red line” on Iran’s nuclear program rather than give a “red light” to preventive military action. Last week the White House declined even to meet with BiBi when he visits Great Satan later this month. Even Haaretz (no fan of Bibi) regards this as a mistake.
Maybe you think 43’s invasion of Iraq was a worse mistake, though it gave that country democracy, showed Arabs that dictators can be toppled, and turned an enemy into a potential ally. But consider the consequences of this president’s decision to pull out of Iraq. Two months ago, at least 100 Iraqis perished in a wave of bombings and shootings by al Qaeda in Iraq, which aims to overthrow the Shia-led government of Nuri al-Maliki. Last week the country’s Sunni vice president was sentenced to death. Meanwhile, Kurdistan is acting like an independent state (or, rather, a satellite of Turkey). Iraq is falling apart.
As for Syria, while 44 fiddles, her cities burn in a civil war that could soon eclipse Lebanon’s in the 1980s.
Pic - "In the headlights"
