Afghanistan

Max Boot, Frederick Kagan & Kimberly Kagan recently visited Afghanistan to get a firsthand look at the situation. They published at least two pieces about their findings (here and here).

While Afghanistan still has plenty of fight in her, the country is far from lost.

• To beat an insurgency you need at least passive cooperation of the population. The good news is that in recent polls only 4% of Afghans desire Taliban rule. This is important factor. In Iraq, before we were able to defeat the insurgents, the Sunni and Shiite insurgents had large support in their respective communities. With the surge strategy in Iraq, which included protecting the locals from insurgent attacks, we were able to win over locals. That support of the local population changed the dynamic and proved key in winning the fight.

• It’s true insurgents have increased their attacks in Afghanistan. But this must be seen in perspective. First, unlike in Baghdad, Kabul and Jalalabad are relatively safe and flourishing. “The idea that Kabul is under siege is a figment of the news media’s imagination based on hyped reporting of a few isolated attacks.” The civilian death count in Afghanistan is 16 times lower than it was in Iraq, pre-surge. And Afghanistan is has a larger population.

• A big problem is with the NATO mandate of not holding prisoners more than 96 hours. Europeans and Canadians appear afraid of any Abu Ghraid or Guantanamo like charges. Such nonsense is self-defeating. This policy alone has greatly contributed to why Afghanistan is still not pacified. This “catch and release” pattern has been destroying the morale of NATO and Afghan military forces. More importantly, it zaps the willingness of Afghan villagers from cooperating with coalition forces. Why help the U.S. or British or French forces capture insurgents when those insurgents will be released to return and extract revenge. In comparison, currently there are only about 900 detainees being held in Afghan and coalition facilities. In Iraq, at the height of the surge, U.S. forces were holding 24,000 people.

• Another big lesson we take from Afghanistan is that fewer partners is probably better. In Iraq the U.S. military had total control of military operations and did all the heavy lifting. Eventually the U.S. was able to find a strategy that worked and fully execute it. In Afghanistan NATO has proven difficult to unify and ponderous in execution. There are European troop contingents with so many self-imposed limitations that they contribute very little at all. In fact they probably get in the way more than they help. We’d be better off without them. U.S. commanders have begun building work-arounds in order to get things done.

• There is the big problem of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Charges of corruption against him are worrisome. The President’s brother has been reportedly linked to the lucrative drug trade in the south. Many think the President is running protection for him.

The fight in Afghanistan seems far from over. The President’s decision to send 17,000 additional U.S. troops is part of a new strategy to change the dynamic in Afghanistan. A surge like strategy can probably work. There are enough similarities between the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan that a hybrid of the Iraq surge strategy is a viable option. Foolish policies like NATO's “96 hour detention” rule must be jettisoned and more realistic rules put in place. Rules like this lack proper seriousness and undermine the mission and sacrifice of our military forces. A change in this policy alone will have a big impact.

The fight is likely to get more intense and causalities are likely to get much higher before things get better. Like in Iraq, it will take time. Whether Americans have the stomach for it is likely to depend on how well President Obama sells the mission, something Bush was not very good at.